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Richard Schmalbeck*  
 [This paper was prepared for the annual conference of the National Center for 
Philanthropy and Law, held at the NYU Law School, held October 24-25, 2013. The overall 
topic was “Tax Issues Affecting Colleges and Universities,” and I was asked to address 
specifically those issues relating to athletics. This paper considers two specific issues that have 
in common only that they involve college sports, and are plagued by egregiously bad, (in this 
case, egregiously generous), tax treatment:  the failure of the IRS to regard any part of the 
revenue from college sports as unrelated business income, and the choice by Congress to allow 
taxpayers to deduct 80% of contributions that they make to colleges or their “booster clubs,” 
even when those contributions entitle the donors to special privileges in purchasing tickets to 
college athletic events. 
 Most readers are probably familiar with the general rules regarding charitable 
contributions deductions, but a word about the unrelated business income tax may be helpful. An 
organization may qualify (or continue to qualify) as a tax-exempt organization, eligible to 
receive tax-deductible contributions, if its activities are primarily charitable.  However, if the 
organization regularly carries on trade or business activities that are unrelated to its exempt 
purpose, the income from those activities is subject to federal income taxation at the same rates 
applicable to for-profit corporations.  Although those rates are low for small businesses (those 
earning less than $75,000 per year), corporate earnings in excess of that amount are taxed at a 
rate of 34% on up to ten million dollars of income, and 35% beyond that amount.  The unrelated 
business income tax raises very little revenue, but is thought to have an in terrorem effect, 
discouraging nonprofit organizations from engaging in unrelated business activities.  While the 
unrelated business tax exists primarily because of Congressional concerns about unfair 
competition with for-profit businesses, a better description of its actual effect is that it 
discourages nonprofit organizations from pursuit of business activities that do not further any 
exempt purpose.] 
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Preface 
 Within the four-year undergraduate experience (or five, if we count the red-shirt year
2—
and in this context, we surely should), there are at least three subdivisions of athletic activity that 
require somewhat separate consideration, and involve increasing cause for concern about the 
soundness of the current tax treatment.  The first, and least problematic, category is intramural 
athletics, in which teams of students from various houses, fraternities, or other affinity groups 
compete with teams of students representing other similar groups within the same university.  
 These activities involve the use of some university resources—playing fields or courts, 
equipment, and usually one or more paid referees, along with some office support in creating and 
distributing schedules, compiling standings, and the like.  A purist might observe that intramural 
sports are not strictly educational—they rarely involve any coaching or instruction--and so are 
not in pursuit of the exempt educational purpose of the university in a direct way.  But that 
would be an unduly narrow view of exempt purpose.  Students are not expected to spend every 
waking hour attending classes or studying; they have fuller lives, and not only may but should 
spend at least some time engaged in activities involving art, music, drama, and recreation, 
including athletics.  Such activities make students healthier and happier, and are quite reasonably 
regarded as an integral part of normal student life. 
 Much the same could be said—though less convincingly—of the second category of 
college and university athletics.  This category would consist of intercollegiate athletics—both of 
the “varsity” and “club” style3--that do not, and are not expected to, produce significant revenue, 
or at least not net income, after allowing for the often considerable costs of engaging in these 
sports.  Traditionally, this “nonrevenue” category has consisted of virtually all intercollegiate 
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 College athletes generally have four years of eligibility to compete in intercollegiate sports.  However, they are 
liberally allowed to decline participation during one year (the “red-shirt” year, so called because they typically 
continue to practice with their teams if injuries do not prevent this, and, at least in some historic period, wore jerseys 
that indicated their nonparticipant status in that year).  This privilege is frequently used in college football, leading 
to a common practice in which freshmen practice with their teams but do not play in that year, but maintain 
eligibility in the four following years.  
3
According to University of New Hampshire (UNH) Athletic Director Marty Scarano, the main difference between 
the “varsity” and “club” classification is university funding.  Although the level of competition may be 
commensurate with varsity athletics, because most of UNH’s funding goes to football, hockey, and basketball, many 
other sports are classified as “club” sports.  Ryan Hartley, “Varsity Sports vs. Club Sports: It Comes Down to a 
Matter of Dollars and Cents,” The New Hampshire (Feb. 13, 2013), www.tnhonline.com/sports/varsity-sports-vs-
club-sports-1.1390663. 
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athletics other than the football and men’s basketball programs at the highest tier of the college 
sports hierarchy—the group of programs that the National Collegiate Athletic Association has 
denominated as “Division I.” 
 Defense of nonrevenue intercollegiate athletics as within a university’s exempt purposes 
is somewhat more challenging than it is for intramural athletics.  In light of the fact that few 
universities in the world (though most in the U.S.) engage in intercollegiate athletics at all, it is 
difficult to maintain that such activities are even a normal, much less a necessary part of the 
university student experience.  And although nearly every U.S. college or university does engage 
in intercollegiate athletics at some level, relatively few students at each institution participate in 
any intercollegiate sports.  Furthermore, those who do frequently find that participation in these 
activities diminishes rather than enhances their overall educational experience, if only because of 
the demands of time and energy imposed on the student-athlete.
4
  
 The lack of a compelling connection to the educational mission, together with the distinct 
possibility that nonrevenue intercollegiate athletics may in some cases reduce the value of the 
educational experience of the student-athlete, are troubling on many grounds.  However, they are 
not ultimately troubling in terms of any issues posed by federal tax law.  Although the relevant 
statute requires that organizations seeking exempt status pursue their charitable purposes 
“exclusively,” the Treasury Regulations implementing this provision have long interpreted this 
requirement to be satisfied as long as charitable purposes are primary.
5
    
 Thus, if nonrevenue intercollegiate athletics can be shown to be merely incidental 
activities of colleges and universities, and not primary, their presence on campus should not 
represent a threat to the institution’s qualification for exemption.6  In most cases, the incidental 
quality of nonrevenue sports would not be difficult to demonstrate.  In the case of Duke 
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 The general NCAA guideline is that, during each sport’s defined season, up to twenty hours per week of the 
student-athlete’s time can be claimed by the team for practices, conditioning and related activities.  This does not 
include travel time to games that are not staged on the student’s own campus, and also involves artificial time-
accounting rules.  For example, the athletic event itself is presumed never to exceed three hours, even if the event is 
a 36-hole golf tournament that may take more than eight. 
5
 Treas. Regs. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). 
6
 Public universities are not subject to the income tax because they are instrumentalities of state governments, rather 
than nonprofit corporations.  Accordingly, they do not need to demonstrate that they primarily serve an exempt 
purpose (though they presumably could do so if they needed to).  See Ellen P. Aprill, “Excluding the Income of 
State and Local Governments: The Need for Congressional Action,” 26 Ga. L. Rev. 421 (1992). 
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University, for example, the array of intercollegiate teams includes twelve men’s teams and, 
equitably, twelve women’s teams.7  This is a considerable roster of teams for a relatively low-
enrollment university.
8
  Nevertheless, the total expenditures for the athletics department—
roughly $78 million in the 2011-12 year
9
--is only a small fraction of the university’s overall 
budget (not including the Duke Health System) of over $2.1 billion.
10
  And while the total 
number of students at Duke who engage in intercollegiate athletics in any year runs to around 
650, that is only about ten percent of the total population of undergraduate students.
11
  Thus, 
even if intercollegiate athletics were determined to be unrelated to the exempt purposes of the 
university, it would seem that they were incidental, and did not constitute a primary purpose of 
the university. 
 Of course, if they are unrelated to the exempt purposes, the possibility arises that these 
activities might generate unrelated business income.  But these sports are called “nonrevenue” 
sports for a reason.  In most cases, they are not literally without revenue:  spectators ordinarily 
pay small admission charges to watch athletic events in some sports within the nonrevenue 
category, such as soccer, baseball, and lacrosse games.
12
  And some television networks, in their 
continued quest to find the bottom of the public’s appetite for college sports, have begun 
televising many of these events, including the College World Series (men’s baseball), the 
counterpart tournament for women’s softball, the final three rounds of the NCAA Division I 
lacrosse tournament, and even regular season women’s basketball games, among many others. 
 So one is left thinking that the nonrevenue category is one to be watched; at any time, a 
sport may achieve a breakthrough level of popularity that will generate enough spectator 
interest—both live and on television--that it will need to be promoted to the “revenue sport” 
category.  And the breakthroughs can be sudden:  the University of Arizona baseball team, for 
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 There are men’s and women’s teams in basketball, cross-country, fencing, golf, lacrosse, soccer, swimming, track 
and field, and tennis.  In addition, there are men’s teams in baseball, football, and wrestling, and women’s teams in 
field hockey, rowing, and volleyball. 
8
 Duke has fewer than 7000 undergraduate students. “The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool,” U.S. 
Department of Education (last visited Sept. 13, 2013), ope.ed.gov/athletics. 
9
  Id. 
10
  Michael J. Schoenfeld, “Trustees Reappoint Brodhead, Approve Budget, Projects,” Duke Today (May 12, 2012), 
today.duke.edu/2012/05/trusteesmay2012. 
11
  See note 7 above. 
12
 Practices with respect to admission charges in sports other than basketball and football vary widely.  But at Duke 
University, charges in the range of five to ten dollars per ticket are the price of admission to the sorts of events noted 
in the text.  
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example, had regular home gate receipts of $69,000 in 2011—a nontrivial amount, to be sure, 
but barely enough to cover even a few scholarships for the players who received them.
13
 The box 
office boomed the following year, however, largely due to the construction of a new stadium: in  
2012, Arizona’s baseball team generated $350,000 in home gate receipts, more than a five-fold 
increase in a single year.
14
   
 But even though Arizona went on to win the College World Series in that year, its 
athletic director denied that the sport generated significant net income.
15
  That claim is entirely 
plausible, because the scholarship, coaching, equipment and travel costs of fielding a 25-player 
team, and transporting them around the country to play its schedule, are considerable;
16
 
generating revenue in the six-figure or even low-seven figure range would not likely be enough 
to make the sport profitable.
17
  And without profit, there would be no tax liability under the 
unrelated business income tax. 
 If the nonrevenue sports are put aside for the moment—subject to further review in the 
replay booth from time to time—we are left with the football and men’s basketball programs at 
Division I universities.  At the present time, there are 242 universities that compete in Division I 
football, and 340 universities that compete in Division I basketball.
18
  Even within this category, 
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 NCAA Division I permits 11.7 baseball scholarships per year.  This means that a college can distribute partial and 
full scholarships totaling the value of 11.7 full scholarships per year.  “College Athletic Scholarship Limits,” (last 
visited Sept 18, 2013) scholarshipstats.com/ncaalimits.html. 
14
 Alicia Jessop, “University of Arizona Baseball:  Making the College World Series . . .and Money,” Forbes On-
Line (June 13, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2012/06/13/university-of-arizona-baseball-making-
the-college-world-series-and-money/. 
15
 Arizona athletics director Greg Byrne has said:  “It’s not a big money-maker.  We made a little bit of money on 
licensing from National Championship shirts . . . .”  www.wildcat.arizon.edu/article/2012/08/greg-byrne-talks-
facilities-olympics-college-world-series. 
16
  According to “The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool,” U.S. Department of Education, Duke reports 
spending over $20 Million on all sports other than football or basketball in the 2011-2012 fiscal year.  If an equal 
amount was spent on each of these sports, Duke would have spent around $1.7 million on its baseball team alone. 
17
 For example, the Cal- Berkeley baseball team nearly got dropped from the roster of Cal teams in 2010 because of 
the substantial financial losses the team had incurred in the preceding years.  It was estimated that the expense of 
conducting their baseball program was approximately $1 million per year, but that it generated only $180,000 in 
revenue.  It has since been resurrected, as a result of a successful $10 million fund-raising effort.  See 
newscenter.berkeley.edu/2011/04/08/baseball-to-continue-at-cal/, and www.my.sportsdreams.com/youth-sports-
fund-raiser-news. 
18
  “About the NCAA,” National Collegiate Athletic Association (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/membership+new.  For football, Division I is divided 
into the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS).  Unlike the FBS, the 
FCS plays a full post-season playoff to crown a national champion, and the FBS schools tend to spend more money 
on their football teams. 
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not all programs enjoy net income in any particular year.
19
  In particular, the teams in the five 
“power conferences”—the Atlantic Coast, the Big Ten, the Southeastern, the Big Twelve, and 
the Pac 12 conferences, plus the Big East in basketball--are the 65-75 institutions that are either 
actually or potentially profitable enough to be worthy of consideration for the unrelated business 
income tax.
20
   
 I have gone through the stages of increasing concern about the relationships of college 
sports to the institutions represented largely because this is a classic problem of the “slippery 
slope” variety.21  Sports seem related to other things that colleges do, but seem less and less 
related the closer we get to a situation in which, for example, a basketball team consists largely 
of athletes who never intend to spend more than one semester actually attending classes.
22
  At 
some point, one senses that one is no longer in the land of higher education, but is instead in the 
realm of national-audience entertainment.  But where is the line to be drawn?  Read on. 
 Following the discussion of big-time college athletics
23
 and its relation to the exempt 
purposes of a university, a quite separate argument will be considered, relating to the current rule 
contained in section 170(l) of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows eighty percent of 
contributions to universities that have the effect of giving the donor an opportunity to buy tickets 
to big-time college sports events.  Because the domain of this rule is by its nature confined to 
big-time college sports, it is not necessary to explore its implications in the context of intramural 
or nonrevenue sports. 
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 Charles T. Clotfelter, Big-Time Sports in American Universities 95, 97 (2011); “2004-08 NCAA Revenues and 
Expenses of Division I Intercollegiate Athletics Programs Report,” NCAA (Indianapolis, Aug. 2009), 8.  Clotfelter 
cites USA Today Web site, financial data for 98 state universities, 2007-2008 fiscal year.  An update to the site can 
be found at usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-05-14/ncaa-college-athletics-finances-
database/54955804/1 with data for 227 public institutions.   
20
 If readers recall Steven Wrights observation that it is odd that we drive on parkways, but park on driveways, they 
will find similarly strange the fact that the Big 10 conference has twelve members, while the Big 12 conference only 
ten.  But as long as conference membership continues to be remarkably labile, perhaps they are wise not to change 
their trademarks too quickly in response to what might be temporary membership changes. 
21
 See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv.L.Rev. 361 (1985).  Schauer’s argument is that most things 
described as slippery slopes in fact have defensible stopping points, where the terrain is acceptably sticky.  That is, 
in my view, precisely the situation I describe in this essay.  
22
 The 2012 national championship team from the University of Kentucky is the state-of-the-art model of the “one-
and-done” business plan.  Because eligibility is determined after the fact, the four freshman who were among the 
starting five that year did not really need to pay any attention to their spring semester classes, since they were—and 
at all times reasonably thought they would be—drafted into the NBA before any ineligibility was established. 
23
 Throughout this essay, the phrase “big-time” will be used to refer to football and men’s basketball at Division I 
schools. 
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Strike One:  Are Big-time College Athletics Related to a University’s Exempt Purpose? 
 Having tightened the focus solely on the big-time sports of college football and men’s 
college basketball, we can begin to consider one of the central questions in this field:  Is pursuit 
of these sports within a university’s exempt purpose?  If the point of such an inquiry is to 
determine whether the university deserves exempt status, all the arguments in the preface can be 
mustered to support big-time athletics as well:  many students participate, and a much larger 
number of students watch; colleges have always sought musicians to staff the orchestra, 
thespians to fill out the playbill, journalists to publish the student newspaper.  Extracurricular 
activities are a part of campus life, and athletics not obviously less so than any other 
extracurricular activity.  None of these activities is strictly necessary; but all contribute to the 
university community in their distinctive ways.  And, in any event, there is the saving grace of 
the “primary” concept:  in the aggregate, a university’s budget will be dominated by the salaries 
of faculty and academic staff, construction and upkeep of the laboratories, classrooms and 
dormitories, management of the university’s endowment, and many other functions.  Large 
universities have budgets that run into the billions of dollars, so athletics budgets that run into the 
tens of millions will not detract from the primary mission of the university.   
 Instead, the primary impact of a determination that engaging in big-time sports is not 
within the exempt purpose is, of course, that these activities may then imaginably be subject to 
taxation as unrelated business activities.
24
  And unlike fencing and volleyball, football and 
basketball can make enough money to cover their fully loaded costs, and still have a profit worth 
subjecting to an unrelated business income tax.   
 There would certainly seem to be a prima facie case for the argument that Division I 
football and basketball should be subject to the unrelated business income tax.  They would seem 
to be a business, in that they are operated in a manner that appears to be designed to generate 
profit; they are regularly carried on; and they are unrelated to the purposes for which exempt 
status was granted to the college or university that houses the particular program.  These are the 
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 IRC §511(a)(2)(B) imposes the unrelated business income tax even on public universities, despite their general 
exemption from federal income taxes. 
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elements of unrelated business subject to the tax under section 511(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code,
25
 and each seems satisfied by the facts presented by most big-time programs.   
 That this is so has been amply documented by others, and there is little point of 
rehearsing the full details here.
26
 But it may be useful to summarize the main observations on 
these points.  As to whether big-time sports are a business, one would note that they generate a 
tremendous amount of revenue, through the sales of tickets, of television and radio rights, and 
merchandise, especially apparel, related to the sports programs.
27
  The athletic activities are 
heavily promoted through a variety of media, especially including television.  The salaries of 
head coaches are routinely two to four times the salaries of the university president, and ten 
times or more the median salary of full-time faculty members.
28
  (And when these are 
questioned, the usual defense is that the coach is “worth it.”)  The games themselves are 
scheduled on dates and at times that are designed to maximize ratings for the broadcasts.
29
 
Tickets to the most popular big-time sports programs are allocated on the basis of seat licenses 
that are essentially auctioned off to would-be buyers—whether they have any relationship with 
the university or not--for whatever the market will bear.
30
 
 Although the big-time sports contests are seasonal—from late August to the bowl games 
in early December for football, and from late October until early April for basketball—they are 
carried on in that seasonal way year after year, which is sufficient to meet the “regularly carried 
on” leg of the unrelated business income tax rules.31  And, in truth, though the games are played 
                                                          
25
 See also Treas. Regs. §1.513-1(a). 
26
 Clotfelter, supra, note 20, at 94 –107. 
27
 Note that some merchandise is very directly related to the sports programs, e.g., replica jerseys with the names 
and numbers of particular players; shirts, etc., that carry legends like “Duke Basketball” of “2010 NCAA Basketball 
Champions;” and even, in Duke’s case, table-top models of Cameron Indoor Stadium, our local temple of basketball 
worship.  It is also reasonable to assume that the Big-Time sports programs contribute to the market for more 
generalized university apparel and gifts.  In Duke’s case, the full array of merchandise can be viewed on the official 
athletics website of the university, goduke.com.  The “.com” designation in itself seems an admission that some 
business is being transacted there. 
28
  In 2011, Duke basketball coach Mike Krzyzewski received a salary of $9.7 million.  Steve Berkowitz, “Duke's 
Krzyzewski Credited With $9.7 Million in Pay for 2011,” USA TODAY Sports (May 16, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2013/05/15/mike-krzyzewski-coach-k-duke-salary-pay-2011/2156231/. 
29
  Steve Eder, Richard Sandomir, and James Andrew Miller, “At Louisville, Athletic Boom Is Rooted in ESPN 
Partnership,” The New York Times (Aug. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/sports/at-louisville-an-
athletic-boom-made-for-and-by-tv.html. 
30
  Clotfelter, Big-Time Sports in American Universities 99 –103. 
31
 This understanding of seasonal activities as being regularly carried on has been part of Congressional intent from 
the beginning, as explained in the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1950, which created the unrelated 
business income tax:  [I]f an organization owned a race track, this would not be considered an occasional activity 
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during only the intervals noted, various other activities—recruiting of players, setting of 
schedules, sales of tickets, etc., go on year around. 
 The only leg of the three-legged UBIT stool that could be said to be seriously contestable 
would be the question of whether or not these activities are related to the broader educational 
enterprise housing them.  Even as to this factor, the case for application of the unrelated business 
income tax seems clear.  The “student-athletes” in these programs seem much more like athletes 
than students:  they are selected primarily for their athletic ability rather than their academic 
ability; they devote huge amounts of time to their sports, especially during the primary seasons 
for their sport, but even in their respective off-seasons; they are ordinarily expected not to engage 
in other intercollegiate sports, and not to take classes at times that would conflict with times set 
aside for practices or games; they travel extensively during which they necessarily miss classes; 
they receive extensive “academic support” from athletic department staff that frequently blurs 
the line between tutoring and actually doing classwork on behalf of the students so “supported;” 
they have generally poor graduation rates, and rarely choose any of the more challenging major 
fields of study available on their campuses.
32
 
 Coaches are hired for their ability to win games and fired for any shortcomings in that 
metric.  Their incentive pay may include a nod toward the academic side of the university (for 
example, a bonus for achieving a particular graduation rate), but those incentives pale in 
comparison with the incentives to field successful teams.  Studies of the bonus structure faced by 
coaches have found that the rewards for success on the field are approximately twelve times as 
large as the rewards for success in the classroom.
33
 
 Expensive facilities for training, practice, and the actual games, are built for, typically, 
the exclusive use of athletes in the big-time programs.  At many universities, the student-athletes 
are even housed and fed in facilities that are separate from (and invariably in such cases, superior 
to) the facilities available to students who are not athletes in one of the big-time sports.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
even though the track was operated only a few weeks every year, since it is usual to carry on such a trade or business 
only during a particular season.  H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81
st
 Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 109 (1950), 1950-2 C.B. 380, 458 
32
 In many universities, programs in “Recreation Management” or the like are available, and in many cases they are 
available primarily to scholarship athletes. 
33
 See Burton A. Weisbrod, Jeffrey P. Ballou, and Evelyn D. Asch, Mission and Money: Understanding the 
University, Cambridge University Press (2008), as cited in Clotfelter, supra note 20. 
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 The Applicability of UBIT to College Sports: the Views of Congress, the IRS, and the 
Courts 
 But despite the seemingly tangential relationship between a university’s big-time sports 
programs and the educational institution whose name they share, all of the major sources of rules 
affecting the tax system--Congress, the Internal Revenue Service, and the courts--have 
universally declared big-time sports to be sufficiently related to the educational enterprise to 
avoid the status of unrelated business activity.
34
 
 This has been true from the very beginning—that is, from the date of enactment of the 
Revenue Act of 1950, which created the unrelated business income tax.  Though big-time college 
sports are not specifically mentioned in the legislative language itself, the committee reports take 
considerable pains—one might almost say that they protest too much—to make it clear that 
Congress couldn’t even conceive of the new tax applying to college sports.  The Ways and 
Means Committee and the Finance Committee seem to have agreed to use something of a zone 
defense of college sports, with the first specifically defending college football, and the latter 
college basketball
35
: 
Of course, [indeed!] income of an educational organization from charges for admissions 
to football games would not be deemed to be income from an unrelated business, since its 
athletic activities are substantially related to its educational program.
36
 
And 
 Athletic activities of schools are substantially related to their educational 
functions.  For example, a university would not be taxable on income derived from a 
basketball tournament sponsored by it, even where the teams were composed of students 
of other schools.
37
 
                                                          
34
 Citations will follow in the specific paragraphs below. 
35
 Their respective choices are a little odd, in light of the fact that college basketball was originally an urban sport, 
played in dank gymnasiums of Catholic high schools and colleges in New York, Philadelphia, and a few other cities.  
Football, in contrast, was of special interest to the fans of the big state universities of the West, Midwest, and South.  
In light of the malapportionment of the Senate in favor of states like Nebraska, Mississippi, and Oklahoma, one 
might have thought that football was their preferred sport.  This reasoning presumably explains the misattribution of 
the two quotations in the text by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 80-296 (1980-2 C,B. 195, 196), which erroneously casts the 
House as the defender of basketball, and the Senate as the defender of football.   
36
 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81
st
 Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 109 (1950), 1950-2 C.B. 380, 458. 
37
 S. Rep. No. 2375, 81
st
 Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 107 (1950), 1950-2 C.B. 483, 505. 
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 The Internal Revenue Service did not immediately follow with its own pronouncements 
on the applicability of the unrelated business income tax to college sports, presumably because it 
did not feel that it needed to.  It simply took no actions that would be inconsistent with the 
language of the legislative history, which sent an unambiguous message that the IRS should not 
and would not consider college sports as unrelated to the exempt purposes of the colleges that 
pursued those sports. Because the IRS did not attempt to assess any taxes on unrelated business 
income with respect to big-time athletics activities, the courts were not called on to make any 
determinations about the applicability of UBIT doctrines to this area.  However, some older 
opinions could be found to support the idea that college sports were appropriately regarded as 
integral to educational experiences.
38
   
 Occasionally, the IRS issued rulings regarding qualification for exemption by athletic 
support groups at a variety of levels of amateur sports:  In Rev. Rul. 55-587,
39
 the IRS ruled that 
an interscholastic body to oversee high-school athletic competition could qualify as a charitable 
organization.  In Rev. Rul. 64-275,
40
 the IRS ruled that a sailing school designed to train teams 
of athletes for international competition, including the Olympics, could also qualify as a 
charitable organization. And in Rev. Rul. 67-291,
41
 the IRS ruled that an alumni organization 
that supported a college’s “training table” for feeding members of athletics teams could qualify 
as a charitable organization.  None of these organizations produced significant revenue, however, 
so no unrelated business tax issues were discussed in any of these rulings.  And of course even if 
UBIT issues had been raised, the findings that the activities described did constitute exempt 
purposes would presumably have answered any questions about whether the IRS regarded these 
activities as related to exempt purpose. 
 
 
                                                          
38
 See, e.g., Dist. Of Columbia v. Shannon & Luchs Const. Co, Inc., 17 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1927).  (This case 
involved the exercise of eminent domain to acquire property for a school athletic field.  The Court summarized the 
case law on the subject, noting that:  “[C]ourts . . . uniformly hold that physical culture and development is an 
integral part of our educational system . . . .”) 
39
 1955-2 C.B. 261. 
40
 1964-2 C.B.142. 
41
 1967-2 C.B. 184. 
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 Television and UBIT 
 During this time, the value of the rights to broadcast, and especially to televise some big-
time sports events—especially college football bowl games and the NCAA basketball 
tournament—was growing.  The 1979 basketball championship—featuring Larry Bird’s Indiana 
State team playing Magic Johnson’s Michigan State team—achieved a college-sports record 
single-game Neilson rating of 24.1, with a 38% audience share at its peak.  This translated to a 
television audience of 18 million households—18 million households with a thirst for beer and 
soft drinks, a yen for pickup trucks, and a mighty appetite for fast food--at least in the judgment 
of the firms that decide to advertise their wares in this venue. 
 Perhaps spurred by this heightened attention, the IRS shortly thereafter ruled that 
television and radio revenue generated by college sporting events did not constitute unrelated 
business activity.  In Rev. Rul. 80-296,
42
 it opined, after a brief and very superficial analysis 
involving the facts of a college football game, that: 
[T]he educational purposes served by exhibiting a game before an audience that is 
physically present and exhibiting the game on television or radio before a much larger 
audience are substantially similar.  Therefore, the sale of the broadcasting rights and the 
resultant broadcasting of the game contributes [sic] importantly to the accomplishment of 
the organization’s exempt purpose.43  
 
 Really?  The live audience and the television audience are “substantially similar?  
Consider a typical football weekend at a Big Ten or Southeastern Conference university (Ohio 
State, Florida, Penn State, Alabama, etc.).  The fun for the students begins on Friday night, with 
a pep rally, maybe a bonfire, and certainly major partying.  On Saturday morning, while the 
students are sleeping off their hangovers, the alumni begin to arrive in their SUVs and station 
wagons for the tailgating that will precede the game.  The alumni often join with classmates 
arriving from different directions, creating hundreds of mini-reunions scattered over the massive 
acreage of the stadium parking lot.  Then, as kickoff approaches, the students and alumni file 
into the stadium, along with faculty, staff, and members of the community whose relationship 
                                                          
42
 1980-2 C.B. 195. 
43
 Id. at 4. 
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with the university may be less intimate, but who are nevertheless loyal fans, willing to pay 
hundreds of dollars for their season tickets. 
 The university president, and the deans of the graduate and professional units, will take 
their particularly desirable seats, along with trustees and other major donors, or people who are 
targets for such status.  After the game, the partying will resume, with more or less festivity, 
depending on the outcome of the game.  Not all of this activity is appealing or healthy, but it 
does all have some meaningful connection with the operations of the university. 
 Compare this with the experience of the television audience.  That group will, in the case 
of a nationally televised game, number in the millions, of which only a small percentage will 
have even the most remote connection with the university.  Most will not be even in the same 
state, much less the same zip code, as the host university.  These viewers hope mostly to be 
entertained by the athletic display.  Some may hope to be enriched, if they have wagers on the 
game with their on-line bookies in the Bahamas.  Some may simply have nothing better to do.  
What they generally do not have is any interest in the educational enterprise that is associated 
with the universities whose student-athletes are on the field. 
 So these audiences are “substantially similar”?  I think not.  Defenders of big-time 
college sports base their defense of existing practices largely in terms of building their university 
communities—fostering “school spirit,” collective identity, and closer connections among and 
between the various constituent groups making up the university:  students, administrators, 
trustees, and alumni, and perhaps as well people who operate businesses in the general vicinity 
of the university.  But little or none of that is going on in the national television audience.  
Rarely, if ever, would a university defend its sports programs on grounds that they serve to 
entertain a national audience of people who are largely strangers to the university community. 
 There may be one exception to this:  university officials do sometimes mention that 
successful big-time sports programs may produce increased interest on the part of potential 
applicants for admission, which in turn may translate to an increase in applicant volume.  The 
evidence on this is mixed, but the prevailing view seems to be that success does produce a 
modest (and transient) increase in applicant volume, but only for the very small number of 
universities at the very pinnacle of achievement in football or basketball—literally only the 
14 
 
teams that win a major bowl game, or make it to the Final Four ® of the NCAA basketball 
tournament.
44
 
 So this effect is small, affects only a few universities, and even when present, may be a 
mixed blessing.  If the marginal applications stimulated by athletic success are largely from 
students who are not well-qualified for admission to that university, there is little benefit at all.
45
  
But it is probably true that at least some of the marginal applicants are well enough qualified to 
be accepted, and perhaps enroll.  However, if I were a provost, I would wonder whether it was 
necessarily a good thing that a few applicants whose interest in the university was based largely 
on its athletic success were displacing a similar number of applicants who were almost as well-
qualified, and had been attracted to the university by its other qualities—qualities more closely 
associated with the things that universities claim to value. 
 Even if university officials do not take this view, being instead wholly pleased with 
application stimulation and other effects of the publicity generated by the success of their big-
time sports programs, it is nevertheless the case that generating greater name recognition would 
not seem to be, in itself, sufficiently related to the university’s exempt purposes to take an 
activity out of the range of the unrelated business income tax.  After all, would manufacturing 
macaroni become a “related” business if the company making the pasta called itself the New 
York University Law School Macaroni Company, and featured pictures of Ronald Dworkin or 
Marty Lipton on its boxes, in the manner of Wheaties (The Breakfast of Champions)?  Even if 
NYU Mac and Cheese became The Lunch of Power Lawyers, it is doubtful that it would save 
macaroni manufacture from being regarded as a business unrelated to the exempt purposes of the 
university. 
 
 
                                                          
44
 Clotfelter, supra, note 20, at 145-46.  One study Clotfelter cites does find an effect, albeit a very small and 
transient one, resulting from finishing in the top 20 in football, or making the round of sixteen in the basketball 
tournament.  Devin G. Pope and Jaren C. Pope, “The Impact of College Sports Success on the Quantity and Quality 
of Student Applications,” 75 Southern Economic Journal 750 (2009).  
45
 One effect of increased applicant volume is that the apparent selectivity of the university may increase, as it 
accepts a smaller percentage of its fattened applicant pool.  This may be slightly helpful; however, the US News 
methodology (as an example) weights acceptance rate as ten percent of the “selectivity score,” which in turn is only 
fifteen percent of the overall score.  Thus, acceptance rate is weighted at only 1.5% of the overall score.   
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 The Special Case of Advertising 
 One reason that it is important to distinguish between the live audience and the television 
audience is that the income produced by the attention of the television audience is largely 
advertising income.
46
  Beginning in the late 1960s, the IRS developed a doctrine that an activity 
that may be within an organization’s exempt purpose may also be viewed as a “content provider” 
(though of course that was not the lexicon of the time) of a sort that makes it an attractive 
platform for advertisers.  When this situation arises, the IRS has argued, it is appropriate to view 
the advertising as a separate activity--one that is unrelated to the organization’s exempt purpose, 
despite the fact that the underlying activity may be within its exempt purpose.   
 In the case of big-time college sports, the income does not come to the universities 
directly from the advertisers, but rather comes indirectly through the various television networks 
that sell the advertising opportunities in the market.  Obviously, the magnitude of the available 
advertising revenue is the reason that networks are willing to pay substantial sums to the NCAA, 
or the various conferences, for the rights to televise big-time athletics contests.  And the dollar 
amounts paid for advertising of college sports have grown in recent years to noteworthy levels.  
For example, it is estimated that the advertising revenue associated with the NCAA basketball 
tournament in 2013 exceeded one billion dollars!
47
 
 Viewing the sale of television rights as implicitly advertising income has important 
implications for the application of the unrelated business income tax.  First, as noted above, 
segregating the sale of advertising from the other aspects of an activity has been used, in effect, 
to require an independent justification of the relatedness of the advertising aspect; this means that 
it is possible that college sports could be exempt from UBIT because they are related to exempt 
purposes, while the sale of advertising opportunities might not be exempt, because it couldn’t 
“borrow” the relatedness of the overarching activity. 
                                                          
46
 This may be changing.  There are now special “networks” that operate by making games—such as all football 
games played by Big Ten schools—available only to subscribers who pay for the privilege of receiving these 
broadcasts through their regular cable or satellite television provider.  In such an arrangement, the cable or satellite 
provider presumably keeps some of the subscription cost, and pays part of it to the conference that arranges the 
telecasts.  There may be advertising sold in connection with these broadcasts as well, but at least a substantial part of 
the income received by the conference, and passed on to its member schools, would come from viewers, not 
advertisers.  The impact of this will be considered below in the section of this essay on “Cable/Satellite Subscription 
Payments.”   
47
 “Kantar Media Releases March Madness Advertising Trends Report,” Kantar Media (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://kantarmediana.com/intelligence/press/2013-march-madness-advertising-trends-report. 
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 Second, segregating an advertising element from the rest of the big-time sports elements 
would be much more likely to yield accounting results that would actually show unrelated 
business taxable income in substantial amounts.  Even if the overall big-time sports picture for a 
university did not show an excess of revenue over expense (and it well might not, in light of the 
possibilities of generating deductions for major items like depreciation on stadiums and other 
facilities), the segregated business of televising college sports would likely show consistent, and 
large profits.
48
  The television networks typically cover the costs of their operations themselves, 
so the amounts that are paid to the NCAA or the conferences, and then distributed to the 
universities, are nearly pure income 
 Finally, the magnitude of television, and its advertising revenue, has ballooned in recent 
years.  It was virtually nil in 1950, when the unrelated business income tax provisions were first 
added to the code.  It had grown considerably by 1980, when the IRS issued Rev. Rul. 80-296, 
but it was even then miniscule compared with today’s dollar volume.  The continuing rise in the 
value of television rights continues to astonish: just when one thinks that one has gotten used to 
very large numbers, the numbers grow larger still.  Writing in 1980, Richard Kaplan noted that 
the broadcast package for the NCAA basketball tournament had doubled in size over just the 
preceding two years.
49
  How much was it back then?  With the addition of a $2,000,000 payment 
from the new Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN) for the rights to televise 
some early-round games, the total had grown to $10,500,000.
50
  A tidy sum, no doubt; but only 
about one percent of the sum paid for the rights to the most recent tournament. 
                                                          
48
 One highly respected commentator disputes this, saying that even if big-time college sports were considered an 
unrelated business activity, the availability of deductions for program costs would likely wipe out any net income.  
See John D. Colombo, “The NCAA, Tax Exemption and College Athletics,” ssrn.com/abstract+1336727 (2009).  I 
disagree, and think that one of the purposes of the fragmentation rule was to split off the costs of the disaggregated 
activity—in this case, televising sporting events—from the overall activity.  Indeed, if that is not the purpose, it is 
difficult to see any advantage in the fragmentation approach.  This conference includes a presentation of a paper on 
the general subject of expense allocation in college and university UBIT disputes written by, um, John D. Colombo.  
Since that paper immediately precedes this one in the program, the accounting issues will presumably have been 
ventilated by the time a presentation is made on the current essay.  Even in the worst case, however, I would note 
that Colombo concedes that some athletic programs would make money no matter how liberal the deduction rules 
might be; and I would note as well that the IRS has the power to amend the accounting rules to produce a better 
match of the actual expenses of televising sports with the revenue produced thereby. 
49
 Richard Kaplan, “Intercollegiate Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax,” 80 Colum. L.Rev. 1430, 
1445 (1980). 
50
 Id.  
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 The dramatic shape of this growth curve is important because it provides a powerful 
reason to re-examine conclusions reached earlier, on very different facts.  Television barely 
existed in 1950, so no one in Congress could have imagined the revenue possibilities that would 
come to be more than sixty years later.  By 1980, the IRS might have had a little more reason to 
think that growth in revenue was robust, and might continue.  But no one in 1980 would likely 
have predicted a hundred-fold increase in television revenue over the following thirty or so 
years.
51
 
 The amount of money at stake has had some predictable consequences.  Schedules and 
game times, for example, used to be the province of the conferences primarily, with input from 
the athletics directors of the member schools.  Increasingly, the dates and times of games are 
dictated by the networks that will be televising the events.
52
  If it once seemed that sports teams 
were appendages of the universities they represented (or vice versa!), it now seems that they are 
increasingly the appendages of ESPN.  So it is certainly worth asking:  just how unrelated to 
higher education does televised big-time college sports have to get before we are ready to 
conclude that it should be subject to the unrelated business tax? 
 Before reaching any conclusions, a closer look at the relevant legal doctrines on 
segregation of advertising income from other aspects of a business conducted by a charitable 
organization is indicated.  The law in this area stems primarily from United States v. American 
College of Physicians, a case involving the applicability of the unrelated business income tax to 
the income derived from selling advertising space in a publication of the College of Physicians 
entitled “Annals of Internal Medicine.”53  Decided in 1986, this case was the culminating event 
in a saga that went on for nearly twenty years. 
 In 1967, the Treasury promulgated a regulation that adopted a new approach to the 
unrelated business income tax.
54
  The Treasury was no doubt concerned that in the case of some 
mixed activities, where some exempt purposes existed, but where unrelated business activities 
                                                          
51
 Note that only a small part of this growth is attributable to inflation.  The Consumer Price index was at 86 when 
the IRS issued the ruling in 1980, and has grown to about 230 today.  So a multiplier of about 2.7 is the appropriate 
adjustment for inflation.  Thus, instead of a hundred-fold growth, it may be more appropriate to speak of a real 
growth of more like a 35-fold magnitude.  That is still huge growth. 
52
  See Sandomir and Miller, supra note 25. 
53
 475 U.S. 834 (1986). 
54
 Treas. Reg. §1.513-1(b) T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274. 
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were going on as well, aggregating the related business activities with the unrelated ones would 
produce accounting opportunities to offset unrelated business income with the expenses that 
were incurred in pursuit of business interests that were related to the organizations’ exempt 
purpose.  Advertising was the chief target:  the reasoning behind the regulation was that seeking 
(and finding) businesses that were interested in placing advertisements in publications of exempt 
organizations were businesses in themselves, and were businesses that had nothing to do with 
exempt purposes of the organization.  Instead, they were about generating revenue. 
 This somewhat aggressive position of the Treasury was the object of criticism, but 
Congress came to the rescue with uncommon speed.  In the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
55
 it 
amended section 513(c) of the Code to specifically endorse this “fragmentation” approach to 
advertising income.  
 The facts of American College of Physicians illustrated the application of this theory.  
The publication involved was clearly within the exempt purpose of the College of Physicians:  it 
carried articles describing research outcomes of interest to a wide range of practicing physicians.  
The articles were scholarly in nature, and were not designed to advance the interests of any 
businesses that might have chosen to advertise in the journal.
56
  The case could have been a test 
case of the fragmentation approach, but after that approach was endorsed by Congress, such a 
challenge would presumably have had to be on Constitutional grounds, which the College of 
Physicians may have thought too high a bar.   
 Instead, what was at stake in American College of Physicians was the specific application 
of the fragmentation rule to advertising in a professional journal.  The government took the 
position that all advertising in such journals was unrelated to exempt purposes; the College of 
Physicians disagreed, and the Supreme Court found for the College on this point.  But having 
won that battle, the College went on to lose the broader war.  The Court declined the IRS 
proffered per se rule, but upon examining the facts in the particular case, found that there was 
little or no editorial control over the content of the advertising, and that the particular ads in each 
journal issue could not be said to be in those pages for the purpose of advancing any charitable 
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 Pub.L. 91-172, 83 stat. 487. 
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 That was the claim, anyway, and the IRS does not seem to have contested it. 
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purpose of the College of Physicians.  They were mostly—and generally quite baldly—about 
selling drugs. 
 The language of Justice Marshall’s opinion suggests that if the College had, for example, 
limited advertisers (mostly drug companies) to advertisements featuring new drugs, or only to 
advertisements that featured clinical findings that might have educational value for the 
physicians reading the journal, then the ads, and the revenue they produced, might have been 
found related to the exempt purpose of the College.
57
 But of course this would have reduced the 
advertising opportunities significantly, so absorbing the unrelated business income tax was 
probably the more economically productive approach. 
 While the IRS enforcement pattern that is available on the public record—and indeed the 
text of the regulations themselves—suggests that the primary interest of the IRS was in print 
advertising in publications like the Annals, the text of section 513(c) is not so limited. At no 
point does it refer either to publications or advertising explicitly, but merely says, in relevant 
part:   
[A]n activity does not lose identity as a trade or business merely because it is carried on 
within a larger aggregate of similar activities or within a larger complex of other 
endeavors which may, or may not, be related to the exempt purposes of the 
organization.
58
 
 
 This is the sort of maddening draftsmanship that leads tax lawyers to say that resort to the 
code should only be undertaken in the event that the legislative history is unclear; and in this 
case, the legislative history is clear enough:  Congress meant to endorse the IRS fragmentation 
approach, so that more-or-less free-standing, revenue-generating parts of an operation could be 
segregated for purposes of accounting for possible unrelated business income.  
 The precise targets were a matter of some debate.  The House Report, while proposing 
language that was not limited to advertising income, mentioned only that in its report.
59
 The 
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 One imagines that the ads were of a more commercial sort: perhaps a picture of an unhappy-looking housewife, 
sitting at her kitchen table, staring into her cup of coffee, with text that reads:  “Does she just have the blues, or is 
she suffering from a treatable medical condition?”  Implicitly:  Surely the latter, and here’s just the drug she needs. 
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Senate added an amendment that would have limited the scope of the provision, curiously,  to 
three activities specified in its report:  advertising, “sales of drugs by a hospital pharmacy to 
persons other than hospital patients,” and “operation of a race track by an exempt 
organization.”60 The Conference report adopted the House version, with minor wording changes 
to make it clear that “no part of it [the unrelated activity] is to be excluded . . . merely because it 
does not result in profit.”61 
 The more general language of section 513(c) would seem to make clear that even if the 
revenue paid by broadcasters were not considered advertising, that would not bar application of 
the fragmentation principle.  However, even if one were to take the narrow view that section 
513(c) applied only to advertising income, it would seem that much of the broadcast and telecast 
income would qualify as such.  Consider, for example, whether the result in American College of 
Physicians would have been any different if the College, instead of publishing the Annals itself, 
had arranged to have a third party publish the Annals, with the understanding that the third party 
would be allowed to sell advertising, and would pay most of the difference between its 
advertising revenues and its cost of publication over to the College.  Surely the injection of an 
intermediate agent into the production of the Annals would make little difference in the analysis. 
 This parallel version of the American College of Physicians facts is fairly close to what 
conferences and the NCAA have done with respect to big-time sports: they have agreed with 
CBS, ESPN, and others that those networks will be allowed to sell advertising that will be shown 
in connection with game broadcasts, with much of the net revenue derived from those sales being 
paid to the conferences or the NCAA.  In fact, the recent creation of the Big Ten network 
indicates that business models involving even more direct sales of advertising are imaginable, 
and are in fact being pursued by some conferences. 
 But whether the advertising revenue is collected directly by a network owned by a 
conference or indirectly, though the medium of a more general broadcast network, it remains 
advertising revenue.  To that extent, it could be subjected to a disaggregation analysis that would 
result in the recognition of substantial unrelated business taxable income.  
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 Cable/Satellite Subscription Payments 
 To this point, no mention has been made of the fact that networks also receive revenue 
from a source other than advertising:  payments from local television cable and satellite 
companies.  The latter have contractual arrangements with subscribers under which monthly 
payments are made in exchange for delivery of a signal by cable or satellite into the viewers’ 
homes.  The basic rate for this service begins at around forty or fifty dollars per month, with add-
ons for additional receivers, high-definition transmissions, optional programming, and other 
features.  These subscription amounts come from the pockets of the viewers, and are more 
analogous to the purchase of a ticket than to advertising; just as is the case with payments for live 
admission to an event, they represent a payment from someone who wants to watch athletic 
contests.  A possible inference from these facts might be that, to the extent that the funds that 
ultimately flow to universities are derived from subscription fees, rather than from advertising, 
they should be not be considered unrelated business taxable income under the fragmentation 
theory just advanced. 
 While such an inference is not facially unreasonable, it ignores the critical difference 
between live attendance and television viewing emphasized in the discussion above of the 
(defective) reasoning of Revenue Ruling 80-296:  on-site viewing of events can be plausibly 
described as having something to do with community-building, providing social capital.  Such a 
claim is not plausible in the case of a distant viewer who may have no connection with the 
universities represented on the field.  Indeed, such viewers are normally not even able to select 
the particular games they would like to watch, except among the limited offerings that the 
networks that are part of that viewer’s subscription provide from week-to-week.  Unlike ticket 
buyers, the viewers at home are usually not even fans of the particular teams whose games are 
featured on any given day.  The several million viewers of this year’s regular-season football 
game of the century—the Alabama-Texas A&M game on September 14—were for the most part 
not enthusiasts of either school’s athletic programs; they simply wanted to be entertained by 
what was expected to be an exciting football game, featuring players and coaches who had come 
to be nationally renowned. 
 I would therefore argue that the money whose source lies in subscription income from 
viewers is unrelated business taxable income for essentially the same reason that advertising 
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income is: it is not derived from activities that have any reasonable relationship to the exempt 
purposes of the colleges and universities that ultimately receive the economic benefits that this 
business provides.  The case may be marginally more difficult to sustain, because the case for 
UBIT treatment of advertising income draws support from Treasury Regulations, the Internal 
Revenue Code, and Supreme Court precedent.  Subscription income is nevertheless conceptually 
similar to advertising income, in the sense that both come from sources too distant from the 
exempt purposes of a university to be considered related to those purposes. 
  
 Possible Defenses to Assertion of Unrelated Business Income Tax Liability? 
 The law on unrelated business income as it applies to big-time college sports contains a 
few other possibly relevant aspects that should be discussed, if only briefly.  The first is the 
“sponsorship” controversy that swelled in the early 1990s, later to be quelled by both a more 
generous view by the IRS, and by subsequent legislation on this topic.  In 1991, the IRS issued 
technical advice to the effect that payments by commercial interests to support college football 
bowl games constituted unrelated business income.
62
  Though identifying information was 
redacted, it was widely known that the particular bowls were the Mobil Cotton Bowl and the 
John Hancock Bowl, and the IRS position came to be known as the “Cotton Bowl ruling.”63   
 This position created a backlash, and the IRS ultimately backed down.
64
  Congress 
secured a limited exemption for sponsorship gifts in section 513(i).  It is possible to imagine that 
the sponsorship exemption could be used in lieu of some advertising as a means of avoiding 
unrelated business income if that concept were held to apply to television revenue generated by 
big-time sports.  However, the rules of section 513(i) seem flatly inconsistent with the type of 
advertising commonly seen in telecasts of big-time sports.  The prevailing preferences of 
advertisers are not of the general form of “This broadcast was brought to you by the generous 
contributions of Nike, Gatorade, Budweiser, and Ford Trucks.”  Rather, those sponsors seem 
clearly to prefer to make a direct pitch about the desirability of their products.  As Yogi Berra 
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supposedly said, it’s hard to make predictions, especially about the future;65 nevertheless, it 
seems likely that advertisers and big-time sports would conclude that, if necessary, it was better 
to pay some amount of unrelated business tax than give up the opportunity to offer conventional 
advertising in connection with the broadcasts.  Big-time sports have become one of the primary 
means of putting messages in front of young, especially male, audiences, and it seems unlikely 
that the unrelated business income tax would much deter advertisers from this mission. 
 Also to be noted is that the one attempt of the IRS to impose unrelated business taxes on 
advertising in connection with college sports was unsuccessful.  In National Collegiate Athletic 
Association v. Commissioner,
66
 the IRS sought to tax the advertising income generated by the 
magazine-like “program” published by the NCAA in connection with its annual Division I 
basketball tournament.  Though the IRS prevailed at the Tax Court level,
67
 that decision was 
reversed by the Tenth Circuit.  One might well ask whether the IRS, having been rebuffed when 
it stuck a toe in these waters, can reasonably hope for better results if it were to jump in head first 
in the manner suggested in this essay. 
 There is every reason to think that it could get better results.  Not only did the IRS win at 
the trial level in NCAA, but even the NCAA conceded that sale of the advertising was unrelated, 
and constituted a business.
68
  The only missing element from a good UBIT case found by the 
court was that the activity was not “regularly carried on.”69  This was barely debatable in the case 
of an annual three-week basketball tournament, but could hardly be debatable in the case of the 
regular seasons for college football and basketball, which extend, respectively, from August 
through January, and from October through April, of every year.  If anything, the language of the 
opinion in this case supports the argument offered in this essay. 
 Finally, if one takes seriously the idea that big-time sports are conducted by amateur 
student-athletes, one must consider whether the general exemption from UBIT for activities 
conducted by unpaid volunteers might apply to big-time sports.
70
  Without even going to the 
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question of whether the student-athletes play “without compensation”71 despite the fact that they 
receive scholarships that may be worth $60,000 or $70,000 (at private universities), one notes 
that the athletic contests inevitably involve a cadre of coaches, trainers, athletic directors and 
their staffs, numbering in the dozens.  These individuals are clearly not volunteers, and in the 
cases of the head coaches and athletic directors, are typically the highest-paid employees of their 
institutions.  This exemption would seem flatly unavailable in this context.   
 
 Prospects for Reform 
 Needless to say, universities are not likely to volunteer to declare unrelated business 
taxable income from televised big-time sports events, especially in light of the fact that Revenue 
Ruling 80-296 explicitly exempts such revenue from the tax. Further action from the IRS would 
be necessary to collect such a tax.  Is this feasible? 
 It is certainly possible. The IRS does occasionally revoke earlier rulings, and in those 
cases it usually replaces them with new rulings that reflect more contemporary facts and current 
analysis.  Revoking Revenue Ruling 80-296 would be a good idea, and entirely defensible both 
on grounds that it was defective ab initio, and on grounds that the truly stupefying infusions of 
revenue that big-time sports have begun to generate could not have been anticipated at the time 
that ruling was published.  No changes in statutes or regulations would seem to be required to 
implement the view that television contracts generate unrelated business taxable income, since 
section 513(c) and its accompanying regulations already point to such a result, as argued above. 
 Is the IRS likely to revoke Revenue Ruling 80-296, and, if it does, is it likely to be able to 
sustain a position contrary to that ruling?  As to the first, it certainly seems doubtful, especially 
in the short run.  The IRS has limited political capital even in the best of times, and these are not 
the best of times.  And the impetus for this action would presumably be initiated by the division 
with primary responsibility for exempt organizations, and that division is currently in a state of 
(largely undeserved) disgrace.  So in the short run, do not expect this scenario to be playing out 
anytime soon at a big-screen sports bar near you. 
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 But it may be worth bringing these arguments to the attention of the IRS, as part of a 
sustained campaign that might eventually lead it to reconsider Revenue Ruling 80-296.  The 
revenue involved—unlike that which is at stake in most UBIT controversies—is substantial, and 
growing at a remarkable rate.  It would seem that it would be healthy for both tax revenues and 
for colleges and universities themselves for the IRS to take a more realistic view of whether 
televised big-time sports are really related to the exempt purposes of a university.   
 If the IRS were persuaded eventually to take the view advocated here, it would probably 
be able to sustain that view in court, in view of strong Supreme Court precedent for 
disaggregation of advertising revenue from the otherwise exempt activity that provided the 
platform for it.  Protecting this position from Congressional intervention offers a less sanguine 
prospect.  Over a period of many years, whenever Congress is asked to back the IRS or big-time 
college sports, its choice has been emphatic, and the IRS has had to run for cover.   
 Just possibly, could that change?  Maybe even Congress would balk at the world that we 
have seen develop in big-time college sports in recent years, and which we see growing worse 
every year.  Coaches are being compensated at levels that must raise even a Congressional 
eyebrow or two.  Scandals involving a wide array of truly disheartening moral failures--academic 
dishonesty, performance-enhancing drugs, illicit payments to players, even sexual favors offered 
to recruits—erupt with regularity in the world of big-time college sports.  Maybe Congress 
would decide not to intervene, as long as it didn’t see the IRS action as imperiling the basic idea 
of big-time sports?  Maybe, though there is not much reason for optimism on this.  It is 
somewhat more likely that this issue, if forced on Congress by the IRS, would prove to be the 
single thing on which the current Congress could quickly agree—but not in the direction 
advocated here! 
 
Strike Two:  The Eighty Percent Solution 
 High on any reasonable list of egregious violations of sound tax policy is the rule of 
section 170(l) of the Code. Under this provision, donors to college and university athletics 
programs can deduct 80% of the amount contributed even if the donor “receives (directly or 
indirectly) as a result of paying such amount the right to purchase tickets for seating at an athletic 
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event . . . .”72  This rather strange rule represents the culmination of an entertaining, but 
ultimately dispiriting, dispute between athletics boosters and the IRS that began in 1984, with the 
publication of Revenue Ruling 84-132.
73
  That ruling examined a hypothetical situation in which 
a donor received, for a contribution of $300 per year—a comically small amount by today’s 
standards—the right to purchase a season football ticket in a “preferred” location between the 
two forty yard lines.  The ruling also hypothesized that there was a waiting list of potential 
donors who sought this privilege.  Under the circumstances, the IRS rather easily concluded that 
the ticket-access privilege had “significant value,” and that the donor could therefore deduct no 
part of the payment unless he could show that his donation exceeded the value of the ticket-
access privilege.
74
  (Implicitly, this would be exceedingly unlikely in a situation in which would-
be donors were on a waiting list to be allowed the privilege.)   
 This was nothing more than a straightforward application of the well-established doctrine 
of disallowance of “gifts” that involved quid pro quo values returned to the donor as part of the 
exchange.  This principle was most authoritatively established by the Supreme Court in 
Hernandez v. Commissioner,
75
 a case decided a few years after the ruling itself.  Although the 
IRS has decided, for reasons never fully disclosed, not to enforce Hernandez as to the actual facts 
that gave rise to it,
76
 there can be little doubt that the quid pro quo doctrine was and is good law.  
Although it was decided after the IRS had issued its ruling on athletic ticket privileges, the IRS 
had had some previous success in establishing this doctrine.  In United States v. American Bar 
Endowment,
77
 the government had argued that amounts paid to the Endowment as premiums for 
life insurance policies were in no part deductible, despite the fact that the policies were priced at 
a level that allowed the Endowment, a charitable entity, to make a profit on the sales.  The 
premiums were nevertheless at amounts not exceeding the cost of similar insurance available to 
the policyholders through commercial insurance companies, so no deduction was allowed.  
Although the final result in this case was not determined until the Supreme Court decided it in 
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1986,
78
 the IRS had won the first round with the Claims Court decision which was announced on 
January 31, 1984; the IRS issued its ruling later that year.
79
 
 The theory behind the ban on deductions of quid pro quo transactions is eminently 
reasonable: the charitable donation deduction is meant to reflect true donations, not exchanges of 
more or less equal value.  If the latter were deductible, why wouldn’t deductions be allowed for 
the payment of hospital bills by patients, or the payment of tuition by students?  The IRS has 
gotten this right, and so has the Supreme Court, generally by wide margins.
80
 
 Despite the soundness of its position, the IRS responded to the firestorm of criticism of 
Revenue Ruling 84-132 by suspending it later in the same year.
81
  Its announcement offered no 
new opinion on the merits, but simply indicated that the IRS would hold hearings on the question 
before finally deciding its position.  A bit over a year later, the IRS, to its credit, stuck by its 
guns, and ruled again that contributions conditioned on the grant of seat privileges were not 
deductible.
82
 
 Several bills were introduced in Congress later in 1986 to reverse this result, and a 
provision to that effect was included in the House bill that became the Tax Reform Act of 
1986.
83
  However, the provision was dropped in conference, and the IRS position survived for a 
time.
84
  But in the next major tax act, the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988
85
 
(which really was a major act, despite its diffident title), Congress overruled the IRS, adding 
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section 170(l) to the Code.
86
  Pointedly flexing its muscles, Congress even added a rather 
unusual provision allowing refund claims by anyone who lost his or her deduction due to this 
frolic of the IRS’ during the previous four years, even as to tax years for which the statute of 
limitations on adjustments would otherwise have expired.
87
  Congress meant not merely to 
overrule the IRS, but to obliterate any trace effects of the IRS attempt to rein in this abusive 
practice. 
 There is very little explanation of what Congress was thinking, which is sometimes 
evidence that it wasn’t.  Because it was added as an amendment, no “reason for change” 
appeared in any committee report.  However, a Joint Committee explanation did the best it 
could: 
 The proposal would eliminate otherwise unavoidable valuation controversies 
between the IRS and many individual taxpayers as to the proper treatment of payments to 
college athletic scholarship programs.
88
 
 Indeed, valuation controversies are not unimaginable under some circumstances.  If a 
college sports program announced to its boosters that very generous donors would be rewarded 
with the opportunity to acquire good seats to football and/or basketball games, some donors 
might give large gifts, and then argue that they did so because of their large hearts, and that they 
could have given less and gotten similar favors.  They might point to other donors who got good 
seats for smaller contributions, arguing that anything over the smallest donation that yielded 
good-seat privileges was deductible. The IRS might then need to evaluate the precise quality of 
the seats of the two donors, to assure that they were in fact comparable—that, for example, end-
zone seats weren’t being compared to sideline seats.  These questions can get difficult, as the 
controversies over valuation of “skybox” seats for purposes of section 274 of the Code have 
shown.
89
 
 But it would not seem generally to be in the interest of universities to structure their seat 
privilege policies this way.  Seekers of seats, or better seats, want to know what it takes to get 
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them.  Vagueness on this question would be annoying, and no university wants to annoy alumni 
and friends who are trying to give it money.  It is possible that some booster organizations might 
attempt some subterfuge, in which the precise dollar amount wasn’t published, but could be 
whispered by the manager of the organization
90
 to alumni and friends who call seeking this 
information.  However, the IRS should be able to penetrate such a ruse fairly easily.  It would 
observe that many contributions were of exactly the same amount, the presumptive minimum; it 
could also simply ask the university to tell it what that number is, or to state officially that no 
such number existed—a statement which would, if false, be a felony. 
 At Duke, there is no ambiguity.  Football tickets are available without any special 
contribution, because Duke’s football team has a long history of mediocrity, or worse.  
Basketball tickets, on the other hand, are a scarce and valuable resource.  There are some breaks 
for faculty and other insiders, but a fan with no current connection to the university must make 
an annual contribution of $7000 to be entitled to buy two season basketball tickets, the purchase 
of which will incur an additional charge of $2000 or more, depending on the location of the 
tickets.  Valuation of the seat privileges would not seem to be difficult under these 
circumstances, which are common among big-time sports. 
 Prospects for Reform of the Eighty-Percent Rule 
 . . . are dim.  This defective rule entered the Code via an Act of Congress, and it will 
require an Act of Congress to repeal it, or otherwise reform it.  Given Congress’ track record of 
extraordinary generosity toward big-time sports, this seems very unlikely.  But it is barely 
possible to imagine that a Congress that is desperately interested in ways to find revenue without 
increasing tax rates might be persuaded that the revenue gain associated with such a change 
would be compelling.  As is the case with the unrelated business income tax, this is an issue 
whose dollar value has increased greatly over the years since the addition of this rule to the 
Code.  The numbers could be significant.  If 100 universities are able, as Duke is, to effectively 
charge $3500 per seat for a seat license, and those universities have on average 20,000 seats that 
are attractive enough to command that premium, the collective amount contributed would be in 
the vicinity of $7 billion.  Eighty percent of that is $5.6 billion, and the revenue loss associated 
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with that, assuming an average marginal tax rate of 35%, is about $2 billion.  An amount in this 
range is not going to pay off the national debt, but if these back-of-the-envelope calculations are 
reasonably realistic, the amount at stake is not trivial.  And this would seem to be a conservative 
estimate: at the top end, at a place like Ohio State, which has had both football and basketball 
teams in the top ten in recent years, and has indoor and outdoor stadiums that seat roughly 
20,000 and 100,000, respectively,
91
 the assumption of 20,000 seats being the subject booster 
programs is very conservative indeed.  Also, the amounts at stake seem to be growing at 
impressive rates (remember the quaint $300 amount mentioned in the 1984 ruling).  That means 
that the revenue loss associated with this defective rule will be growing as well, making a ten-
year revenue estimate for repeal of section 170(l) a potentially eye-catching number.  It would 
seem at a minimum to be a large enough number that it might well finance a few other 
miscellaneous, revenue-losing proposals that members of Congress might wish to make, but only 
if they could be done on a revenue-neutral basis.
92
  So there is some hope. 
 
Is There a Third Strike? 
 There are other tax issues associated with college sports, but none rise to the level of 
importance of the two that have been the primary subject of this paper.  There is, of course, 
always the issue of the faulty accounting for gifts in kind, which are deductible at their fair 
market value, rather than at their adjusted basis.
93
   This is on a par with the eighty-percent rule 
described above, in that both rules lack any reasonable defense as a matter of tax policy or 
accounting.  However, this rule is not particularly implicated by big-time sports.  While gifts to 
booster clubs could presumably be made in the form of, say, appreciated stock, they are probably 
made in this form infrequently, if only because the specific target number required to obtain seat 
licenses makes gifts in kind somewhat awkward.   
 One might also question whether the use of tax-exempt financing to construct stadiums 
should be permissible, since section 501(c)(3) bonds may not be used for facilities that are 
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constructed for the purpose of generating unrelated business income.
94
  However, the main 
argument as to unrelated business income in this essay has been that revenue from television 
might be unrelated business income, even if the live audience has a sufficient nexus to the 
educational purposes of the university that it may avoid the UBIT category.  That more narrow 
UBIT argument would seem to have some chance of success, but that argument effectively 
concedes that the live audience is not generating unrelated business income.  If that’s the case, 
then the stadiums, which house the live audience, would continue to be eligible for tax-exempt 
financing. 
 Finally, there are questions about accounting for unrelated business income in the case of 
mixed-use facilities on university campuses.  The basketball arena may be used to stage rock 
music concerts, or NBA exhibition games; the golf course may be open to the public at regular 
market rates; or, most famously, the hockey rink may be rented out for ice shows.
95
  Broadly, the 
problems in this area can run in either of two directions.  Most commonly, the problem is that 
both the regulations and case law may be excessively generous in allowing allocated deductions 
against the gross unrelated business income, resulting in little or no income, and hence little or 
no revenue.   
 A variant on this pattern seems to have emerged recently, at least in the eyes of the IRS.  
It believes that in some cases, activities that are related to the exempt purpose of a university are 
being classified as unrelated business activities, because these related activities generate losses 
that can be used to absorb the otherwise taxable unrelated business activity.
96
  A hotel adjacent to 
the campus, for example, might be operated primarily for university business, but categorized as 
an unrelated business activity by the university in order to use its net losses in this way. 
 While these are significant issues, they have less to do with big-time athletics than with 
more general questions about tax accounting in complex institutions that conduct both exempt 
and nonexempt programs.  There is also a separate paper being prepared on these issues for this 
conference, so the better course seems to be to defer to that paper for a fuller discussion of these 
issues. 
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Conclusions 
 The purpose of this essay is not to destroy big-time college sports.  If that were the 
purpose, it would be completely pointless.  Big-time sports are deeply and widely popular; they 
are not going away.  But they are also unmistakably commercial, at least in some aspects.  While 
the on-campus aspects of college sports may have some connections, however remote, with the 
educational purposes of the institution that sponsors them, the televised programming associated 
with college sports has no substantial connection to those purposes. When the broadcasting of 
college sports was largely local, and the revenue derived from it quite modest, it may have been 
appropriate to ignore the tangential connection to exempt purpose.  But as the broadcasting of 
college sports has gone national, and begun to produce prodigious amounts of revenue, it no 
longer makes sense to ignore the fact that it is generating unrelated business income for the 
participating universities. 
 In 1980, the IRS made a mistake, even in light of the facts known at the time, in ruling 
that television revenue was related to exempt purpose.  But as the revenue has grown a hundred 
fold in the years since, it has become clear that a reevaluation of this mistake is increasingly 
needed.  The doctrine of disaggregating advertising revenue provides a plausible hook for the 
unrelated business income tax, but in fact any revenue from the sale of television rights has the 
same basic qualities:  it furthers no educational purposes, and cannot be considered related to the 
university’s reason for exemption. 
 And when Congress added section 170(l) to the Code twenty-five years ago, it made a 
mistake.  It too may have misjudged the significance of the deduction it was authorizing in 
declaring eighty percent of “contributions” made to purchase seat licenses was deductible, but 
that significance has become clearer as big-time sports have grown ever more big-time in the 
years since.  There is now a substantial revenue loss associated with this provision, and the 
provision has no convincing rationale.  Congress should review the rule, and close this loophole. 
 In all likelihood, neither of these changes would very much change the big-time sports 
landscape.  They would reduce, but not hugely, the financial benefits of engaging in big-time 
sports.  They might result in a world in which the best coaches were paid only twice as much as 
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the presidents of the institutions that employed them.  Staffs might be reduced, so that a 
particular assistant coach would have to be responsible for coaching both the wide receivers and 
the tight ends.  These changes would not be catastrophic; indeed, they would barely return big-
time sports to the status they enjoyed twenty years ago. 
 What they would do is to improve the coherence and fairness of the federal income tax.  
College sports are successful enough without the sizable subsidies that the current rules provide 
them.  While college sports have powerful friends, who will probably successfully resist the 
reforms suggested in this essay, it is nevertheless a battle worth fighting.   
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